A motion by a Carbon County man to suppress oral and written statements he made to police concerning numerous arson brush fires he is charged with starting, was denied by a county judge.

Frank Duane Swartz, 43, of Summit Hill, filed a motion to suppress the statements he gave to police on Nov. 24, 2008. It was denied in a 10 page opinion filed by President Judge Roger N. Nanovic II.In his motion to suppress, Swartz made three allegations - 1) he was denied counsel after requesting same while in custody; 2) that police improperly coerced or induced his confession by promises of leniency and threats of incarceration if he did not cooperate; and 3) that his Miranda rights were not given until after incriminating statements had been made, at a time when he was in custody and being questioned by police.State police confronted Swartz after a one month period, between March 17 to April 18, 2008, in which 16 separate brush fires were intentionally set in three adjoining municipalities in southern Carbon County - Lower Towamensing and Franklin townships and Parryville.Police said the device used to start the fire was a lit cigarette, acting as a fuse, inserted in a matchbox and bound together with a rubber band, which was found at the scene of many of the fires.Forensic testing revealed in one instance a cigarette filter with a DNA profile allegedly matching Swartz and, in another instance, a matchbook with a fingerprint of Swartz's right index finger.With this evidence police secured a search warrant for Swartz's home in Summit Hill, his vehicle and to obtain a DNA sample.The warrant was served at the home and evidence gathered. Swartz then met Trooper David Klitsch, a full-time fire marshal and lead investigator, and Robert McJilton, a fire investigator, with the state bureau of forestry. The meeting occurred at the Summit Hill police station on Nov. 24, 2008.In his opinion, Nanovic writes that once Swartz entered the interview room at the police station and was confronted by the two officers about "hard evidence" they had against him, including his fingerprint and his DNA profile, he was in custody.However, Nanovic notes that during a hearing on the suppression motion Swartz said after being told of the "hard evidence" he remarked, "Maybe I should speak to an attorney." Nanovic adds, "This statement is not, as Defendant contends, an unequivocal request for counsel. It is, at most, an indication that Defendant was thinking about requesting counsel but had not yet made a decision. Accordingly, even were we to find that such a remark was made, standing alone, it would be insufficient to trigger Edwards' prophylactic rule which requires as a threshold inquiry that Defendant clearly invoke his right to counsel in the first instance."Concerning the voluntariness of the confession, Nanovic said the court must first examine the totality of the circumstances.Nanovic notes that Swartz was told at the outset of the interview that he was not going to be arrested whether he denied involvement or acknowledged his guilt. Nanovic also writes, "Second, Defendant's request that he not be arrested that day if he cooperated signifies his awareness of his predicament and his ability to independently act, for his benefit, to delay his arrest until after the holidays in order to spend time with his family." He continues, "Third, Defendant's refusal to admit involvement in two of three other fires about which he was questioned, supports, rather than weakens, our finding that Defendant's confession was the proeduct of a rational and free choice."Concerning the waiver of his Miranda rights, Nanovic wrote, "Finally, as a finding of fact, we have determined that no incriminating statements were made by Defendant before his Miranda rights were given. To the contrary, after reading his Miranda rights, these rights were waived at 5:40 p.m. before any questioning concerning the fires began."Swartz had pleaded guilty to charges in the case in January 2010. But on May 28, 2010, he withdrew his plea and asked to a trial.Swartz pleaded to 16 criminal counts and in a plea agreement was to be sentenced to a state prison term of four to eight years.